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RECENT DECISIONS
Robinson-Patman Act: Interpretation of "Like Grade and Qual-
ity"-In Federal Trade Commission v. The Borden Company,1 the
United States Supreme Court held that physically and chemically
identical goods packaged and sold by the same manufacturer are
within the scope of Section 2(a) of the Robinson-Patman Act,2
which prohibits discriminatory price differentials between purchases
of commodities of "like grade and quality," even though the goods
bear different brand names.
The respondent packaged and sold evaporated milk under its Borden
label and under various private labels owned by its customers.: Both
the Borden brand and the private brand milks were physically and
chemically identical, but the private brand milk was sold on both whole-
sale and retail levels at prices substantially below those commanded by
the nationally advertised Borden label. 4 The Federal Trade Commission
found both the Borden and private label milks to be of "like grade and
quality" and the price differential to be discriminatory within the pro-
visions of Section 2 (a). 5
The respondent's contention, adopted by the Court of Appeals in
setting aside the Commission's order, was that a demonstrated consumer
preference for one brand over another was as critical in a determination
of "like grade and quality" as are the physical properties of goods.
"Consideration should be given to all commercially significant distinc-
tions which affect market value, whether they be physical or promo-
tional."'7 The respondent was careful to interject that brand differences
1383 U.S. 637 (1966).
249 Stat. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C. §13(a) (1964).
3 Some economists refer to this marketing practice as "dual branding." Mueller,
Processor v. Distributor in Food Distribution, reprinted in BAUM, THE ROBIN-
SON-PATMAN AcT, SUMMARY AND COMMENT (1964).
4Borden Company, FTC Drt. 7129, Trade Reg. Rep. 16, 191 (1962). In some
cases, preferred customers enjoyed a price differential of as high as 20 to 25
per cent.
5 Section 2(a) provides in part:
It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, either directly
or indirectly, to discriminate in price between different purchasers of
commodities of like grade and quality where either or any of the pur-
chases involved in such discrimination are in commerce, where such
commodities are sold for use, consumption, or resale within the United
States or any territory thereof or the District of Columbia or any insular
possession or other place under the jurisdiction of the United States, and
where the effect of such discrimination may be substantially to lessen
competition or tend to create a monopoly in any line of commerce, or
injure, destroy or prevent competition with any person who either grants
or knowingly receives the benefit of such discrimination, or with cus-
tomers of either of them: Provided, that nothing herein contained shall
prevent differentials which make only due allowance for differences in
2u!aBpp aiqj uio. 2uillnsSi XI AI 9P jo '5laS 'ainloelnu-m 1o so: qf
methods or quantities in which said commodities are to such purchasers
sold or delivered.
6 Borden Co. v. FTC, 339 F.2d 133 (5th Cir. 1964).
7 Id. at 137.
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alone do not cause identical commodities to be of unlike grade. A de-
cided consumer preference for one of the brands must also exist, man-
ifested by a willingness to pay more for the premium brand.8 The
United States Supreme Court's rejection of this argument, although
doing little to clarify the precise meaning of the "like grade and quality"
phrase, has vindicated the established view of the Commission that
only physical properties are to be considered in a determination of the
grade and quality of identical products, and that labels alone do not
differentiate products for the purpose of this determination. This is
true even though one label has been accepted by a vast segment of the
buying public so as to be capable of commanding a higher price in the
marketplace.9 In every case, a determination of whether the commodities
are of "like grade and quality" is a threshold finding essential to the
applicability of Section 2(a). 1° It should be noted, however, that the test
of "like grade and quality" within the meaning of the section is relevant
only to compare two or more products sold by one seller to several
buyers, and not to compare the products of competitors." The pro-
hibited practice is that of granting price differentials to only a few
select customers, which in turn would permit them to drive prices
down without a loss of profit. An interpretation of the proper test of
"like grade and quality" formed the heart of the present decision. The
test advanced by the respondent is the "market acceptability" or econ-
omic test, and that advanced by the Commission, is the physical test,
which represents the majority position among the commentators.2 The
tests are similar in that each requires an initial comparison of the physi-
cal characteristics of the goods, since a finding of dissimilarity would
immediately terminate further inquiry into the question of an alleged
price discrimination. The significant difference between the tests is in
their determination of the basis by which the goods of one seller are
to be distinguished from those of another in the light of their theoretical
impact upon commerce.
According to the Commission and other advocates of the physical
test, the statutory requirements have been met wherever the goods in
s The situation referred to has been termed "product differentiation" and has
been defined as "any situation which induces a buyer to be willing to pay
more for a product bought from one seller rather than from another, or as
any consideration that causes one dealer to be preferred to another as a
seller of goods even though the price is the same with both sellers." MYERS,
ELEMENTS OF MODERN ECONOMICS, 57, 59 (4th ed. 1956).
9 See WHITAKER CABLE CORP., 51 F.T.C. 958 (1955); Page Dairy Co., 50 F.T.C.
395 (1953) ; United States Rubber Co., 46 F.T.C. 998 (1950) ; United States
Rubber Co., 28 F.T.C. 1489 (1939); Hausen Inoculator Co., 26 F.T.C. 303(1938); Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co., 22 F.T.C. 232 (1936).
10383 U.S. 637, 639 (1966).
11 E.g., E. B. Muller & Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, 142 F.2d 511, (6th
Cir. 1944); cf., McWhiter v. Monroe Calculating Machine Co., 767 F.Supp.
456 (W.D. Mo. 1948).
12 A list of the Commentators is compiled by the Court in the subject case.
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question have been found to be physically identical. Thereafter the
onus is upon the manufacturer to prove that any differences in price
between the brand names are cost justified, or defensible as a good faith
effort to meet the, price of a competitor.
The proponents of the market acceptability test urge, on the other
hand, that the Commission's myopic resolution not only ignores a fun-
damental reality of the marketplace, but actually endangers effective
competition. The argument is that intangible factors such as advertising
effectiveness, promotional gimmicks, reputation and even color or de-
sign of the package play a substantial role in determining consumer
buying patterns, and that they are an actual part of the consumer's
purchase. The unknown brand, which through its very obscurity lacks
favorable consumer recognition, must necessarily be sold at prices which
are sufficiently low so as to overcome, in some measure, the advantages
enjoyed by the nationally advertised brands. But the Robinson-Patman
Act, coupled with an interpretation of product identity based solely on
physical differences, would bar a manufacturer or a distributor from
selling his secondary brands for less than is strictly justified from "dif-
ferences in the cost of manufacture, sale, or delivery" of the goods.'3
Since the manufacturer may be doing little more than pasting a new
label on his familiar product, he has hardly any cost differential to look
to, and certainly not one large enough to allow him to list the goods
at prices to attract prospective buyers.' 4 Thus, the argument continues,
a new commodity has been prevented from entry into the competitive
marketplace, and the public denied access to an inexpensive, yet high
grade, product. The solution to the dilemma would be to permit an
inquiry into the consumer's preferences. If the consumer is unwilling
to buy an unfamiliar product at prices similar to that of the premium
brand, he has determined, at least in his own mind, that the products
are dissimilar. Whatever his reasoning, however irrational, the fact is
that he will not buy.',
The validity of this argument is, of course, not the decisive factor.
No matter how accurately it may reflect the realities of the marketplace,
the precise question is whether or not the test of consumer acceptance
13 See note 5 supra.
11 Not to be overlooked, however, is the possibility of actual cost differences
attributable to the expenses of quality control and advertising. For example,
Borden attempted to show that the large sums expended solely on the Borden
labeled milk to ensure high quality while the milk was on its customer
shelves had resulted in real differences between the brands. The Court noted
that "if Borden could prove the difference it is unlikely that the case would
be here." 383 U.S. 637, 642 (1966). The commission has allowed cost differ-
ences resulting from advertising and promotion expenses when the cost
can be directly attributable "to any particular customer, to any particular
product or line of products or to any particular class, discount or otherwise
of customers." C. E. Niehoff & Co., 51 F.T.C. 1114, 1137 (1955).
15 See CHAMBERLAIN, THE THEORY OF MONOPOLISTIC COMPEITIox (8th Ed.
1962) ; Brown, Advertising and the Public Interest: Legal Protection of Trade
Symbols, 57 Yale L.J. 1165 (1948).
1967]
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was intended by Congress to be included in the concept of "like grade
and quality," in view of the wording and policy of the Act.
The Robinson-Patman Act, as an amendment to the Clayton Act,",
was an extension of the desire of Congress to end the "common prac-
tice of great and powerful combinations engaged in commerce" of
slashing prices in certain localities with the intent of destroying com-
petition.17 From the environs of Congressional emotionalism18 came an
act aimed at bolstering the antitrust laws by placing purchasers on equal
footing and ensuring that price differences would be reasonably related
to cost differences. 1 9
When traveling beyond generalities, one is struck by an astonishing
scarcity of evidence as to what congress meant by the "like grade and
quality" phrase. 20 Two considerations, at least, suggest the intended
meaning. First, the wording in the Clayton Act, relative to the requisite
degree of product similarity, was in fact altered by the Robinson-Patman
amendment. Section 2 of the original Clayton Act denounced price dis-
crimination which threatened "to substantially lessen competition or
tend toward monopoly in any line of commerce," but afforded the
defense that the discount was granted "on account of differences in
grade, quality, or quantity of the commodity sold." In the amended
version, on the other hand, the like grade or quality defense was trans-
formed into the affirmative element of "like grade and quality." Thus
likeness in grade and quality became a determinant of when the Act
applies, with Section 2(a) relegating the immunity of quantity discounts
to a defense applicable only when justified by cost. To determine whether
or not the amended phrase incorporated the concept of consumer accep-
tance necessitates passing to the second consideration. As the amendment
passed through the legislative process, attempts were made to alter the
phrase so as to include goods of like "design""2 in one instance, and in
another, goods of like grade, quality and "brand." 2 Both attempts were
attacked as subtle devices to emasculate the Act. The Court, in the
present case, noted the latter proposal, and particularly its denunciation
by the bill's draftsman, Mr. Teegarden, who stated:
1038 Stat. 730 (1914).
7H.R. Rep. No. 627, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1914).
18 For an interesting collection of "congressional demagoguery verging on hy-
sterical" see Rowe, Price Differentials and Product Differentiation: The Issues
Under the Robinson-Patman Act, 66 Yale L.J. 1 (1956).
19 Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co., 22 F.T.C. 232, 330 (1936).
20 For suggested interpretations of "like grade and quality" and associated mate-
rials see, Rowe, Price Differentials and Product Differentiation: The Issues
Under the Robinson-Patman Act, 66 Yale L.J. 1 (1956); Cassady and
Grether, The Proper Interpretation of "Like Grade and Quality" Within the
Meaning of Section 2(a) of the Robinson-Patinan Act,, 30 So. Cal. L.R. 241(1957).
218 Cong. Rec. 82 34-34 (1936).
2Hearings on H.R. 4995 before the House Committee on the Judiciary, 74th
Cong. 2d Sess., p. 421.
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To amend the bill by inserting "and brands" . . . is a specious
suggestion that would destroy entirely the efficacy of the bill
against large buyers... [and] would impose no limitation what-
ever upon price differentials except as between different pur-
chasers of the same brand . . . [but] would leave every manu-
facturer free to put up his standard goods under a private brand
for a particular purchaser and give him any price discount or
discrimination that he might demand.23
Although the Teegarden statement hardly amounts to a Congres-
sional mandate, it was sufficient to permit the Court to speculate:
We doubt that Congress intended to foreclose these inquiries
[into alleged discriminations] in situations where a single seller
markets the identical product under several different brands,
whether his own, his customers or both.
2 4
Notwithstanding this expression of doubt, it is suggested that the
ambiguity in the Act's history and expression25 is such as would have
left the Court relatively unhampered by legislative commitment and
free to interject into the law either the economic or physical test.26
The Court bolstered its position by using an economic argument of
its own, which dealt primarily with the ease of circumvention of the"
statute if a contrary holding were reached. To escape the Act, a seller
would only need
. . . to succeed in selling some unspecified amount of each
product to some unspecified portion of his customers, however
large or small the price differential might be. The seller's pricing
and branding policy being successful would apparently validate
itself by creating a difference in "grade" and thus taking itself
beyond the purview of the Act.2 7
An obvious inconsistency would also result. Suppose, for example, that
a wholesaler purchased a quantity of milk from Borden, and packaged
it under two different, private labels. Through the wholesaler's effort
in advertisement and promotions, one label might gain greater consumer
appeal than the other. Applying the market acceptability test to this
situation, the result is that the milk is no longer of like grade and
quality in the hands of the wholesaler, even though it was of like grade
and quality when purchased from Borden. "Such an approach would
obviously focus not on consumer preference as determinative of grade
23Hearings on H.R. 4995 before the House Committee on the Judiciary, 75th
Cong., 1st Sess., p. 9.
24383 U.S. 637, 642 (1966).
25 "Precision of expression is not an outstanding characteristic of the Robinson-
Patman Act." Automatic Canteen Co. v. FTC, 346 U.S. 61, 65 (1953).
2G6 Mr. Justice Stewart, writing for the minority noted: "The spare legislative
history of the Robinson-Patman Act is in no way inconsistent with a con-
struction of §2(a) that includes market acceptance in the test of like grade
and quality." 383 U.S. 647 (1966).
27 Id. at 642.
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and quality but on who spent the advertising money that created the
preference .... "28
If successful, the seller could discriminate at will, placing favored
retailers at a competitive advantage, for only the favored retailer could
offer the wide selection of goods at the variety of prices which would
attract a greater number of consumers. Perhaps a greater economic
hardship, though not discussed by the Court, would befall the small
independent distributor.
A competitive problem may arise if one or more large firms are
engaged in dual branding and are in competition with firms sell-
ing only distributor brands. On this structural setting, the
dual-brand seller which has a strong branded product is in a
position to "spoil" the distributor-brand market by selling some
products in this market at very low prices, while continuing to
sell products under its differentiated product at higher prices.
This, of course, establishes a cost price squeeze on the distributor-
brand seller and may force him out of business. In this market
setting, although the smaller firm may be an efficient producer of
distributor-label products, he pursues a perilous existence in
competing with his larger dual-brand rivals.
2 9
The Court's decision goes no further than to hold that in Section
2 (a) cases, the test of "like grade and quality" is to be based solely
on a physical comparison of the goods, without consideration of the
"economic factors inherent in brand names and national advertising."30
Manufacturers may continue to package and sell private brand goods
which are identical to their premium product and sell them at a lower
price, providing that the price differential is not discriminatory within
the meaning of the Act, or under the defenses of cost justification and
good faith meeting of competition under Sections 2 (a) and 2 (b).
A determination of consumer preference, however, has not been
obliterated from the Act. Although inapplicable to the "like grade and
quality" test when the goods are identical, it is applicable to the defenses
within the Act. "[Tangible consumer preferences as between branded
and unbranded commodities should receive due legal recognition in the
more flexible 'injury' and 'cost justification' provisions of the statute."3'
Furthermore, the Federal Trade Commission has employed the market
acceptability test in situations where the goods are not chemically iden-
tical. In one situation, the commission has used consumer preference
to resolve the issue of "like grade and quality" in cases where minor
physical differences in the products accompanied brand differences.3 2
2SIbid.
2 See note 3 at 148.
30 See note 1 at 1098.
31 Ibid.
32Universal-Rundle Corp., CCH Trade Reg. Rep. Transfer Binder 16948
(FTC Drt. 8070, June 12, 1964); Quaker Oats Co., CCH Trade Reg. Rep.
Transfer Binder 17134, (FTC Drt. 8112, Nov. 18, 1964).
[Vol. 50
RECENT DECISIONS
In other instances, the commission has resorted to consumer preferences
to determine whether or not a seller met competition in good faith
under Section 2 (b) when he reduced the price of his premium product
to that of a non-premium competitor." The majority of the Court in
its decision ignored the former situation and avoided the latter, leaving
the law in question in these areas.
A careful reading of the case reveals a conspicuous absence of two
factors vital to a clear understanding of the meaning of "like grade
and quality." First, although the physical test has been selected, no
definition of the test was presented. Obviously, comparison of physical
characteristics is involved. The questions are: (1) Which characteristics
are critical to the determination; and (2) By what means can the differ-
ences be measured? Some characteristics may be non-functional, for ex-
ample, the color of spark plugs, and hence not play a significant part in
the determination. Other characteristics may be functional but their
particular role may be difficult to determine. Thus, in Champion Spark
Plug Co.,34 spark plugs differing only in the design of the insulators and
"ribs" were held to be not of "like grade and quality." The effect which
the alteration had upon the performance of the spark plugs was not
discussed.
Second, guide lines or limits were not established within which a
determination could be made of how dissimilar goods may be, and yet
be found of "like grade and quality." In American Can Co. v. Bruce's
Juices, Inc.,3" different sized (2/16 of an inch) tin cans were held to
be of "like grade and quality" because "nominal physical differences
in appearance of some items not affecting their functional utility may
not except differentials from the act."3 6
The reasons for the Supreme Court's unwillingness to enter into
these issues, at present, are apparent. In the first place, the fact situation
in Borden (identical goods) did not demand the construction of either
definition or guidelines. By definition, identical goods must be of "like
grade and quality." If a consumer preference has been manifested, it
must be founded upon illusion or fancy, for nothing about the taste,
smell or nourishing qualities of the milk justifies that preference. In
the second place, the words "like grade and quality" nearly defy clear-
cut definition. No tribunal has satisfactorily explained them. The
concepts of grade and quality flow together like quicksilver.3 7 Though
33 See Callaway Mills Co., CCH Trade Reg. Rep. Transfer Binder 1963-1965, 16,
800: Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 54 F.T.C. 277 (1957).34 Champion Spark Plug Co., 50 F.T.C. 30 (1953).
85 87 F. Supp. 985 (S.D. Fla. 1949) aff'd 187 F.2d 919 (5th Cir. 1951). Compare
E. Edelman & Co., 51 F.T.C. 978 (1955).
3G 87 F. Supp. 985, 987 (1949).
3 For a valiant attempt at definition, see Cassidy and Grether, The Proper In-
terpretation of "Like Grade and Quality" Within the Meaning of Section
2(a) of the Robinson-Patinan Act, 30 So. Cal. L. Rev. 241, 252-256 (1957).
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such phrases as "functional utility" are employed, as in Brice's Juices,
supra, they have little practical application and engender confusion.3 1
The Borden case marks the first time that the Supreme Court has had
the opportunity to interpret the "like grade and quality" phrase. Pru-
dence dictates a firm foundation upon which to construct a meaningful
interpretation of the phrase, one devoted strictly to the issue at hand,
stripped of inconsequential dicta. The Borden decision clearly estab-
lishes that foundation.
ANTHONY KARPOWITZ
Criminal Law: A New Approach to the Defense of Insanity:
State v. Shoffner: Alexander William Shoffner was charged with
burglary, arson and armed robbery. The jury rejected his plea of not
guilty by reason of insanity and convicted him on all charges. Although
many interesting questions were raised on appeal, this discussion will
be limited to the problems involved in the defense of insanity.
In the trial court, the testimony on the issue of insanity presented a
most unusual situation. The two sets of expert witnesses did not testify
in terms of the same legal concepts. The expert witnesses for the de-
fense testified essentially in terms of the American Law Institute
formulation of insanity' and gave opinions as to Shoffner's capacity
for cognition and volition. The court appointed experts were questioned
in terms of the Wisconsin standard of State v. Esser2 which deals
38 The phrase could be interpreted to mean that the function of a can is to
contain something with its utility determined by its usefulness in performing
that task. The difficulty with Brice's case is that what was denominated as
"nominal physical differences in appearances" (more accurately, differences
in the size of the cans) do, in fact, affect the usefulness of the cans, although
not their function. A 12 oz. can is not useful for holding 13 ounces. Another
interpretation may be that the buyer is willing to use either size can. For that
matter, he may be willing to use any size can. But does that mean that all
cans are of like grade and quality? Apparently not. But the slippery concepts
do spawn questionable conclusions. See General Foods Corp., 52 F.T.C. 798
(1956) ; Atlanta Trading Corp., 53 F.T.C. 565 reversing 258 F.2d 365.
'The American Law Institute provisions which will be referred to throughout
this discussion are:
Article 4. Responsibility
Sec. 4.01 Mental Disease or Defect Excluding Responsibility.
(1) A person is not responsible for criminal conduct if, at the time
of such conduct as a result of mental disease or defect he lacks sub-
stantial capacity to appreciate the criminality (wrongfulness) of his
conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law.
(2) As used in this Article, the terms "mental disease or defect" do
not include an abnormality manifested only by repeated criminal or
otherwise anti-social conduct.
Model Penal Code §4.01 (Proposed Official Draft, May 4, 1962).
2 16 Wis.2d 567, 115 N.W.2d 505 (1962). The supreme court in Shoffner clarified
the scope of the Esser test for insanity when it said:
In instructing the jury, the learned circuit judge faithfully followed
our decision in State v. Esser and defined the defense of insanity in
terms of capacity to understand the nature and quality of the act and
capacity to distinguish between right and wrong with respect to it.
State v. Shoffner, 31 Wis.2d 412, 418, 143 N.W.2d 458, 460 (1966).
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with only the cognitive capacity of the defendant, and may loosely be
termed the "right-wrong" M'Naughten test.3
The defense called the chief psychologist and the clinical director
(a psychiatrist) from the Milwaukee County Mental Health Center,
North Division. Essentially, their testimony was that Shoffner was
mentally ill and suffered from a type of schizophrenia which caused
him to act as he did. In the opinion of these witnesses, Shoffner would
not have committed the acts in question if he had not been suffering
from this illness. Their testimony further asserted that Shoffner lacked
substantial capacity to conform his conduct to the requirements of the
law which he was alleged to have violated; he did not have any real in-
sight into his conduct; and, consequently, he could not make any real
moral judgment regarding his conduct. However, these witnesses also
testified that Shoffner had a good fundamental understanding of right
and wrong and was aware that it was wrong to commit the acts in
question.
Two other psychiatrists were appointed by the court. These wit-
nesses, in response to questions by the court, testified that Shoffner
was "sane", that he had sufficient mental capacity to understand the
nature and quality of his acts, and that he could distinguish between
right and wrong with regard to these acts. They were not asked, and
did not testify as to whether Shoffner suffered from a mental disorder;
consequently, they gave no opinion as to the characteristics, symptoms
or affect on Shoffner's behavior of a mental disorder if he did suffer
from such.
The trial court charged the jury on the issue of insanity in terms of
the Esser definition, which considered whether the defendant under-
stood the nature and quality of the act and had to distinguish between
right and wrong with respect to it. The issues on appeal, with which
this discussion will deal, challenged this concept of the insanity defense.
The decision of the Wisconsin Supreme Court in State v. Shoffner 4
announced a new and somewhat novel approach to the perplexing
problems inherent in the defense of insanity. Prior to the Shoffner
decision, the defendant had to raise a reasonable doubt as to his capacity
to understand the nature and quality of his act and his capacity to dis-
tinguish between right and wrong with respect to it.5 This has been
interpreted to mean that once a defendant introduces evidence which
raises the question of insanity, the state must prove beyond a reasonable
doubt that he was, in fact, sane.6 This procedure is still available to a
defendant.
3M'Naughten Case, 10 Clark & F. 200, 8 Eng. Reprint 718 (1843).
431 Wis.2d 412, 143 N.W.2d 458 (1966).
r State v. Esser, 16 Wis.2d 567, 115 N.W.2d 505 (1962). See Wis. STAT. §957.11
(1965).6 State v. Esser, supra note 5.
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Now, however, the defendant may, at his option, proceed under a
more liberal definition of insanity if he also assumes the burden of
proof which has previously been upon the state. The court's formula-
tion of this option is quite specific.
Such waiver should be written, signed by defendant and his
counsel, and filed with the court before trial, with notice to the
district attorney, along with a written request for appropriate in-
structions based on the American Law Institute definition of the
defense of insanity, and an instruction that the defendant has the
burden, to satisfy or convince the jury, on this issue, to a reason-
able certainty, by the greater weight of the credible evidence.7
In a footnote to this statement of the option and waiver, the court
specifically referred to the Wisconsin Jury Instructions-Civil, Part 1;
200,8 with regard to the burden of proof. This open adoption of a civil
standard in a criminal proceeding is quite significant. Since this civil
standard is to apply to the defense of insanity, there are strong argu-
ments that other civil standards related to the burden of proof are also
applicable.
One particularly relevant civil standard or rule is the rule that the
party with the burden of proof may make the opening and closing
arguments to the jury. In fact, in Carmady v. Kolocheski, the court
accorded this the status of a right when it stated:
The right to open and close is a matter of substance and the
advantage which it gives is properly placed with the party that
has the burden of establishing his claims. Not only can the party
who opens and closes in a large measure delimit the field of the
debate, but he can also reply to his adversary and show to the
jury the fallacy, if any, in his argument, and he has the oppor-
tunity of making the last strong impression upon the minds of
the jury. One who is wrongfully deprived of such an advantage
in a close case can properly be said to be prejudiced thereby.9
(Emphasis supplied.)
The difficulty in a criminal case may be to decide who in fact has the
burden of proof when the defense of insanity is introduced under the
Shoffner option. From the language of the court in Shoffner, the de-
fendant has the burden of establishing his insanity "by the greater
weight of the credible evidence." One might speculate as to whether
this requires the defendant to prove the nonexistence of an element
of a crime, and if so, whether this denies him due process of law.
The United States Supreme Court dealt with exactly this sort of
challenge in Leland v. Oregon.10 The defendant in Leland failed to
establish his defense under a statute which required him to prove his
7 State v. Shoffner, 31 Wis.2d 412, 427, 143 N.W.2d 458, 465 (1966).
8 Id. at 427, n.21, 143 N.W.2d at 465, n.21.
9 Carmady v. Kolocheski, 181 Wis. 394, 397-398, 194 N.W. 584, 585 (1923).
10 343 U.S. 790 (1952).
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insanity beyond a reasonable doubt. The statute was challenged as
being violative of due process in that it required an accused to prove
the nonexistence of an element of a crime-i.e., the requisite mental
state. The Supreme Court found no denial of due process because it
concluded that the ultimate burden on the state did not shift; the burden
on the defendant was merely a measure or quantum of proof required
to establish a defense.
These . . . instructions, and the charge as a whole, make it
clear that the burden of proof of guilt, and of all the necessary
elements of guilt, was placed squarely upon the State. As the
jury was told, this burden did not shift, but rested upon the
State throughout the trial, just as, according to the instructions,
the appellant was presumed to be innocent until the jury was
convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that he was guilty. 1
The instructions quoted in the court's opinion 2 make it clear that
the evidence related to defendant's mental state is to be considered in
two contexts. The first question is whether there is a sufficient quantum
of evidence to establish the defense of insanity. The evidence, if it fails
to establish insanity, is then weighed to determine whether it raises a
reasonable doubt as to the existence of the requisite mental state. Under
these circumstances, there is apparently no constitutional conflict.
The dual aspects of an insanity defense were rather clearly de-
lineated by the United States Supreme Court in Leland. The court re-
ferred to the jury instructions 3 which required evidence of insanity
to be considered with the question of intent even if the the jury did
not believe the defendant was insane. The distinction is further empha-
sized in the following statement:
We have seen that, here, Oregon required the prosecution
to prove beyond a reasonable doubt every element of the offense
charged. Only on the issue of insanity as an absolute bar to the
charge was the burden placed upon appellant. 14 (Emphasis
added.)
The approach of the United States Supreme Court does not appear
to conflict with the line of Wisconsin decisions supporting the proposi-
11 Id. at 795.
12 Id. at 794-795. The judge directed the jury as follows:
I instruct you that the evidence adduced during this trial to prove
defendant's insanity shall be considered and weighed by you, with all
other evidence, whether or not you find defendant insane, in regard
to the ability of the defendant to premeditate, form a purpose, to de-
liberate, act willfully, and act maliciously; and if you find the de-
fendant lacking in such ability, the defendant cannot have committed
the crime of murder in the first degree.
I instruct you that you should find the defendant's mental condi-
tion to be so affected or diseased to the end that the defendant could
formulate no plan, design, or intent to kill in cold blood, the defendant
has not committed the crime of murder in the first degree.
"3Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790, 794, 795 (1952).
'4 Id. at 799.
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tion that the ultimate burden of proving guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt is on the state. Wisconsin has also consistently held that facts
peculiarly within the knowledge of the defendant, which mitigate or
excuse the crime charged, must be proved by the defendant.15 Con-
sequently, the rationale underlying the Shoffner decision would seem
to be entirely consistent with both state and federal concepts, if the
issue of insanity is viewed as serving a dual function-a bar to prose-
cution if established by the requisite quantum of proof, and a challenge
to the element of criminal intent regardless of whether insanity is alter-
natively established.
The significance of this duality is not entirely clear, although its
existence has, to some degree, been recognized in Wisconsin decisions. 6
The lack of clarity is a result of several factors which may or may not
have been clarified by Shoffner.
First, accepting the proposition that the defendant must raise facts
peculiarly within his knowledge to mitigate or excuse his actions, the
quantum of proof required of him is not easily understood. In Kreutzer
v. Westfahl, for example, the court said:
But it has been held in many cases that when a negation of
a fact lies peculiarly within the knowledge of the defendant, it
is incumbent on him to establish that fact.1 7 (Emphasis sup-
plied.)
Shoffner, of course, requires that the defense of insanity be estab-
lished "by the greater weight of the credible evidence." This criteria
is probably understood fairly well by a majority of lawyers. However,
this criteria may control only one aspect of the insanity question. The
Shoffner decision could be read as dealing only with that aspect which
is a complete defense-a bar to prosecution.
In other words, the quantum of proof required by Shoffner to
establish insanity as a bar to prosecution is probably not the quantum
of proof which will necessarily raise a reasonable doubt as to the de-
fendant's intent to do the act in question. As the same evidence seems
applicable to both questions, the distinction between these aspects of
the insanity question could be especially apparent if there were separate
trials for the defense of insanity and the criminal charge.
15 Kreutzer v. Westfahl, 187 Wis. 463, 204 N.W. 595 (1925).
16 The supreme court of New Mexico in State v. Padilla, reversed a conviction
of first degree murder, rape, and kidnapping when the trial court refused toinstruct the jury ". . . that they might consider mental defects and mental
condition in ascertaining whether or not the defendant had the power to delib-
erate the acts charged, so as to reduce the charge from first degree murder to
second degree murder." State v. Padilla, 66 N.M. 289, 292, 347 P.2d 312, 314(1959).
Before reaching their decision, the court pointed out that eleven states
adopted this position. The states listed included Wisconsin.
17 187 Wis. 463, 478, 204 N.W. 595, 601 (1925).
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A second difficulty involved in the plea of insanity is the subjective
nature of the element of intent, and the presumptions that have con-
sequently resulted. These premises have been concisely stated by the"
Wisconsin Supreme Court:
It is a general rule, applicable in all criminal cases, including
those where a specific intent is an element of the crime, that
accused, if sane, is presumed to intend the necessary or the
natural and probable consequences of his unlawful voluntary
acts, knowingly performed.'" (Emphasis supplied, citation omit-
ted.)
This statement could reasonably be interpreted to mean the pre-
sumption of intent is removed when the sanity of the defendant is in
issue. It could also mean the presumption of intent, raised by proof of
the consequences, remains until insanity and lack of intent is estab-
lished by the defendant.
The fact situation of State v. Carlson.9 seems to indicate that even
when the issue of insanity is raised, the presumptions remain. In Carl-
son, a doctor offered to testify to the results of an electroencephalo-
graph test which she performed on the defendant. The testimony offered
was to the general effect that the defendant suffered from an organic
disorder of the brain which was further affected by instability in his
emotional environment. The result of such disease was behavior over
which the individual had virtually no control-behavior governed by
irresistible impulses. The refusal to admit the testimony was held not
to be in error, although the court's rationale underlying that conclusion
tends to make the decision somewhat confusing.
The offered testimony suggests no reason why defendant
could not form an intent to burn a building, nor does it tend to
rebut the presumption that he intended the natural and probable
consequences of his acts. We are of the opinion, however, that
if the offered testimony, together with other expert testimony,
had sufficiently tended to prove that at the time of the offense
defendant was subject to a compulsion or irresistible impulse
by reason of the abnormality of his brain, the testimony should
have been admitted. Even under the right-wrong test, no evi-
dence should be excluded which reasonably tends to show the
mental condition of the defendant at the time of the offense. 20
The implication here is that proof of a general state of insanity,
which could cause the act in question, is not sufficient to rebut the pre-
sumption of intent.
A third difficulty is involved in the dual aspects of insanity as it
appears in criminal proceedings. When dealing with the quantum of
proof that will necessarily raise a reasonable doubt as to the defend-
38 State v. Vinson, 269 Wis. 305, 309e, 68 N.W.2d 712, 70 N.W.2d 1, 4 (1955).
19 5 Wis.2d 595, 93 N.W.2d 354 (1958).20 Id. at 607, 93 N.W.2d at 360-361.
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ant's intent to commit a given act, it is not clear what amount of evi-
dence is required. The only evidentiary standard discussed in any de-
tail by the court is whether the evidence is sufficient to convict. This
standard is articulated by the Wisconsin Supreme Court in Gauthier
v. State:
When testing the sufficiency of the evidence, this court is
not required to be convinced of the guilt of the defendant be-
yond a reasonable doubt, but only that the jury or the court
could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. 21
Consequently, we do not know what is necessary, as a practical matter,
before the court, in a jury trial, will find that the defendant did not
form the requisite intent. If a defendant in fact need only raise a
reasonable doubt (rather than prove his lack of intent beyond a reason-
able doubt), it is curious that the court does not more often remove the
issue from the jury's consideration.
The Shoffter decision may give rise to situations which will require
clarification of this state of affairs. It does not seem unreasonable, for
example, that a case may occur in which uncontradicted scientific testi-
mony is given to the effect that a defendant did not have substantial
capacity to conform his conduct to the requirements of law and that
he did not intend to do the act in question. Assuming that the credi-
bility of the expert witness is not in question, the question could well
be whether the jury would be allowed to ignore such testimony or
whether the defendant had raised a reasonable doubt as a matter of law.
Whether it is possible practically to raise a reasonable doubt as to in-
tent, as a matter of law, without proving insanity beyond a reasonable
doubt is a question that will have to be decided.
The Shoffner decision, consequently, raises several questions which
the court may be called upon to answer. If a defendant elects to pro-
ceed under the Shoffner option, does failure to establish insanity by the
greater weight of the credible evidence necessarily preclude a subse-
quent claim that a reasonable doubt as a matter of law has been raised
as to capacity to form intent? Will uncontradicted medical testimony
be sufficient to raise such a doubt as a matter of law, or may a jury
ignore uncontradicted unimpeached medical evidence? Will assump-
tion of the burden of proof on the issue of insanity entitle the de-
fendant to make the influential opening and closing arguments to the
jury, or entitle him to a separate trial on this issue? If the defense of
insanity is tried separately, and prior to the criminal trial, to what
extent will testimony on the question of insanity be admissible on the
question of intent?
JOAN KESSLER
2128 Wis.2d 412, 416, 137 N.W.2d 101, 103-104 (1965), cert. denied 383 U.S.
916 (1966).
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